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RECONSIDERING CONTRACTUAL WAIVERS OF THE 
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN FEDERAL COURT 
Amanda R. Szuch* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial are increasingly 
inserted into agreements creating a conflict between the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial and the freedom to contract.  Disputes 
over these contract provisions between citizens of different states will 
undoubtedly lead to more federal courts sitting in diversity being faced 
with the decision of whether federal or state law is to be applied.  Thus 
far, courts have consistently avoided making the choice of law 
determination under the required guidance of the Erie doctrine, and have 
instead applied inconsistent and irrelevant standards in drawing choice 
of law conclusions. 
Part II of this Comment will introduce the Seventh Amendment right 
to a jury trial and various standards that have been applied at the state 
and federal level to the validity of contractual jury waivers.  Part II also 
addresses the standards that apply to the validity of other forms of jury 
right waiver.  Lastly, it will explore the method of determining whether 
federal or state law is to be applied in federal courts sitting in diversity.  
Part III of this Comment will outline the conflicting approaches taken by 
circuit courts addressing contractual waivers of the jury right.  Part IV 
will explain the irrelevance of Simler v. Conner to determining the 
validity of contractual waivers of the jury right and will conduct an Erie 
analysis to conclude that there is no bright-line rule as to whether courts 
sitting in diversity are to apply federal or state law when determining the 
validity of contractual jury right waivers.  Lastly, this Comment argues 
that if federal law is to be applied, the less rigorous standard, similar to 
that of arbitration agreements, should be applied to waivers of the jury 
right. 
 *   Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  The author would like 
to thank her editors, God, her friends and family, especially her parents, David and Antoinette Szuch, for 
their support, encouragement and patience throughout law school. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The Constitution of the United States guarantees numerous 
protections to the citizens of the United States.  With the increased use 
of waivers of the right to a jury trial, there are conflicts between the 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and the freedom to contract.  
There are also several methods for waiving the right to a jury trial 
including: contractual waiver, waiver by agreement to arbitrate, and 
Rule 38(d) waiver by failure to request.  Each of these types of waiver is 
subject to varying degrees of scrutiny, and ambiguity exists as to the 
standard to be applied under federal law as well as the varying scrutiny 
applied by individual states, when applying state law with regard to 
contractual waivers.  These conflicts are apparent when a dispute over a 
contractual waiver of the right to a jury trial is moved into federal court 
sitting in diversity because the court must resolve the choice of law issue 
in order to establish the relevant standard to be applied to the waiver.  In 
order to resolve the choice of law issue, the courts must tackle the Erie 
doctrine, established in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and its progeny, which set 
forth the rules governing choice of law issues.  This Part discusses the 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and various ways that right can 
be waived.  Next, it explores the varying state and federal contractual 
jury right waiver standards.  Lastly, this Part gives a background of Erie 
and explains the Erie doctrine analysis courts have used and should 
apply in future cases when resolving conflicts of law while sitting in 
diversity in federal court. 
A. Seventh Amendment 
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and 
no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of 
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”1  The 
Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated to the states through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2  However, almost 
all states protect the right to a trial by jury through their state 
constitutions.3  The Seventh Amendment extends the right to a jury trial 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 2. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (“The Court has not held that the right to 
jury trial in civil cases is an element of due process applicable to state courts through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 3. Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: 
2
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in federal civil cases where, if tried in 1791, would have had a common 
law right to trial by jury.4  The Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury to apply to mixed cases involving 
equity and law and has asserted that “only under the most imperative 
circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures 
of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury 
trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable 
claims.”5  The Court has held that the right to a jury trial may be 
waived.6  The Supreme Court has also held that the right to a trial by 
jury is a fundamental guarantee, and “every reasonable presumption 
should be indulged against its waiver.”7 
B. Methods for Waiver of the Jury Right 
Waiver of the jury right can be exacted in several ways, each subject 
to varying degrees of scrutiny by the courts.  Arbitration clauses allow 
for parties to agree in advance to forego dispute resolution in the court 
system and instead “present their case to a neutral third party decision-
maker instead of a judge, jury, or administrative agency.”8  As a result, 
an agreement to arbitrate implicitly includes a waiver of the right to a 
jury trial.  The standard applied to determine the validity of consent to 
arbitrate is the same as contract law consent standards9 and was 
established by the Federal Arbitration Act.10  The contract approach to 
agreements consenting to arbitrate applies “mutual manifestations of 
assent”11 to validate consent, by which “[t]he requirement to form a 
contract is not that parties actually assent to its terms. . . . [but] that they 
take actions—such as signing their names on a document or saying 
Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 797 (1977). 
 4. Rachael E. Schwartz, “Everything Depends on How You Draw the Lines”: An Alternative 
Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 599, 600 (citing 5 JAMES WM. 
MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 38.08 42 (Daniel R. Coquillette, et al., eds., 2d ed. 
1995)). 
 5. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510–11 (1959); see also Dairy Queen, 
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472–73 (1962). 
 6. Bank of Columbia v. Okley, 17 U.S. 235, 244 (1819). 
 7. Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882). 
 8. Brian D. Weber, Contractual Waivers of a Right to Jury Trial – Another Option, 53 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 717, 726 (2006). 
 9. Stephen J. Ware, Mandatory Arbitration: Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and 
Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 167, 170 (2004). 
 10. Id.  “[T]he Federal Arbitration Act provides that a ‘written provision . . . to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.’”  Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)). 
 11. Id. at 171. 
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certain words—that would lead a reasonable person to believe that they 
have assented to the terms of the contract.”12 
The jury right can also be waived inadvertently through a failure to 
properly and timely request a jury trial.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
38(d) states that “[a] party waives a jury trial unless its demand is 
properly served and filed.”13  Waiver can be exacted by accidentally 
failing to file a proper request, so the standard applied to this type of 
contractual waiver is extremely low. 
A final means to waive the jury right is through consent in a pre-
executed contractual agreement.  The standard applied to contractual 
waiver of the jury right has been inconsistent in the lower courts, 
specifically surrounding the issue of whether federal or state law applies.  
Erie R.R. v. Tomkins and its progeny established the methods for 
determining whether state or federal law is to be applied in federal 
courts, which has become known as the Erie doctrine and will be 
explored later in this Comment. 
C. Federal Versus State Law Contractual Jury Waiver Standards 
This subpart will explain the somewhat ambiguous federal standard 
that has been applied to contractual jury right waivers.  It also addresses 
the varying state law standards applied when state courts have addressed 
contractual waivers of the jury right. 
1. Federal Standard 
The Supreme Court has never expressed a specific standard for civil 
cases evaluating the contractual waiver of the jury right,14 but the Court 
has applied a “knowing, voluntary, intentional standard” in criminal 
cases involving waiver of constitutional rights.15  The Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Fuentes 
v. Shevin16 “in applying the knowing and voluntary standard to a waiver 
of due process rights in a conditional sales agreement, cautioned that it 
was ‘not holding that [the] standards [governing waiver of constitutional 
 12. Id. (quoting Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 83, 113 (1996) (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 8.5 (3d ed. 1999))). 
 13. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d). 
 14. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh 
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 678 (2001). 
 15. See id. at n.40 (citing Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). 
 16. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
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rights in a criminal proceeding] must necessarily apply.’”17  The Fuentes 
Court established that a waiver of a constitutional right “must, at the 
very least, be clear.”18  With limited exceptions, the lower courts have 
applied the heightened standard “variously expressed in words such as 
knowing, voluntary, and intentional” in determining the legitimacy of 
contractual waivers of the jury right.19 
2. State Standard 
Standards applied to determine the validity of contractual waivers of 
the jury right differ depending upon the state law being applied.  The 
Seventh Circuit, in applying Illinois state law to jury right waivers held 
that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)20 applied and no heightened 
requirement of separate signing or separate negotiation existed.21  Other 
states have used ordinary contract standards to determine the 
enforceability of contractual waivers.22  Still other states such as 
Georgia and California have held that contractual waivers of the jury 
right cannot be enforced.23  Moreover, “[c]ontractual jury waivers are 
unenforceable in Montana by statute and in Oklahoma by constitutional 
provision.”24  Finally, many states have adopted the heightened federal 
standards requiring voluntary, knowing and intentional waiver and strict 
construction of the waivers.25 
 17. K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting Fuentes, 
407 U.S. at 94). 
 18. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 95. 
 19. Sternlight, supra note 14. 
 20. The Uniform Commercial Code was created in response to a need for “greater uniformity 
among the states in commercial law” and is a collection of “revised versions of the most significant 
uniform acts adopted earlier in the twentieth century by the National Conference of Commissioners.”  
CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., RULES OF CONTRACT LAW: SELECTIONS FROM THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE, THE CISG, THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, AND THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, 
WITH MATERIAL ON CONTRACT DRAFTING AND SAMPLE EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 1–2 (2007). 
 21. I.F.C. Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
 22. Brian S. Thomley, Comment, Nothing is Sacred: Why Georgia and California Cannot Bar 
Contractual Waivers in Federal Court, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 127, 134 (2008) (citing L&R Realty v. Conn. 
Nat’l Bank, 715 A.2d 748, 753 (Conn. 1998)). 
 23. Id. (citing Bank S., N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 799 (Ga. 1994); Grafton Partners, L.P. 
v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 493 (Cal. 2005)). 
 24. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (2007); OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 8). 
 25. Robert Frankhouser, The Enforceability of Pre-Dispute Jury Waiver Agreements in 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 8 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 55, 74 (2006) (citing Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, 
Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in State Civil Cases, 42 A.L.R. 5th 53 (2004)). 
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D. The Erie Doctrine 
The Erie doctrine, as established and developed in Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins and its progeny, provides a roadmap for determining whether 
federal or state law is to be applied by federal courts sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction.  This determination is significant with regard to contractual 
waivers of the right to a jury trial because contract disputes, which are 
typically resolved in state courts, can be removed to federal court on the 
basis of the diversity of citizenship of the parties to the litigation.  The 
federal court sitting in diversity must determine which law to apply.  
This Comment will first explore the relevant statutes applicable to an 
Erie analysis and explain the evolution of the doctrine through Supreme 
Court decisions.  This Comment will next establish the diverging paths 
of the analysis through exploration of Supreme Court decisions applying 
and developing the doctrine. 
1. Relevant Statutes 
Two relevant statutes relate to the application of the Erie doctrine.  
The Rules Enabling Act26 provides that 
(a) [t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of 
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United 
States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) 
and courts of appeals; (b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right.  All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no 
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.27 
Essentially, this gives the Supreme Court the authority to enact 
procedural rules for federal courts and establishes that any law that 
conflicts with federal procedural law is not applicable in federal court. 
The Rules of Decision Act28 (RDA) provides that “[t]he laws of the 
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United 
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be 
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United 
States, in cases where they apply.”29  The RDA establishes that in civil 
actions in federal court, state law is to be applied unless the federal 
Constitution, treaties, or statute governs the issue. 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 27. Id. 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
 29. Id. 
6
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2. Swift v. Tyson 
In Swift v. Tyson,30 the Supreme Court interpreted the word “laws” in 
the RDA to include state statutes and local customs only, and not the 
state court decisions or state common law, established by state courts.31  
Swift was a diversity case brought in federal court in New York because 
it centered on the enforcement of a bill of exchange and turned on 
“whether a pre-existing debt constituted consideration for an 
endorsement of the bill, making the endorsee a ‘holder in due course.’”32  
The outcome of the case depended upon whether federal common law or 
New York common law applied.33  The Court narrowly construed the 
language of the RDA to apply only state statutes and local customs and 
did not require the federal courts to apply state common law.34  Swift 
established that in diversity cases, federal courts were to apply state 
statutes and local customs, but could disregard state common law on 
issues including contract interpretation and commercial law and should 
instead look to “general principles and doctrines” in making decisions.35  
The doctrine established in Swift was highly controversial,36 and led to 
judicial decisions that affirmed abusive behavior.37  Despite the 
 30. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938). 
 31. Id. at 18–19. 
 32. RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 919 (4th ed. 2008). 
 33. Id.  Federal common law would have found valid consideration while New York common 
law would have concluded that there was invalid consideration.  Id. 
 34. See Swift, 41 U.S. at 18–19.  The Supreme Court stated that “[i]n the ordinary use of 
language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of the Courts constitute laws.  They are, at most, 
only evidence of what the laws are; and are not of themselves laws.”  Id. 
 35. See id. at 19. 
 36. See TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM 92 (1981) (“By the 1890s the Swift doctrine had become a center of controversy dividing 
the nation’s bar, proponents of federal judicial reform in Congress, the judges of the lower federal 
courts, and the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.”); see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945) (“During the period when Swift v. Tyson (1842–1938) ruled the decisions 
of the federal courts, its theory of their freedom in matters of general law from the authority of state 
courts pervaded opinions of this Court involving even state statutes or local law.” (quoting Vandenbark 
v. Owens-Illinois Co., 311 U.S. 538, 540 (1941))). 
 37. For example, Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co. involved a 
contractual agreement between Louisville and Nashville Railroad and Brown & Yellow Taxicab, for the 
exclusive rights to board trains and solicitation of passengers as well as use of land to await arrival of 
trains.  Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 522–23 (1928).  The 
railroad company was incorporated in Kentucky and initially Brown & Yellow was incorporated in 
Kentucky, but reincorporated in Tennessee in order to create diversity of citizenship that would allow 
the controversy to be reconciled in federal, rather than state court.  Id. at 522–24.  Brown and Yellow 
sued to enjoin Black and White, a competing Kentucky corporation, for interfering with the agreement 
by soliciting passengers in violation of the contractual agreement between Brown and the railroad.  Id.  
Although state common law decisions invalidated similar contracts, the Supreme Court, in upholding the 
7
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controversy, the holding in Swift was controlling law for 96 years until 
the case was overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins38 in 1938. 
3. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Erie stood for several propositions: 
(1) state law should be applied in cases unless the issue is governed by 
the Federal Constitution or federal statutes;39 (2) state law includes state 
statutes and state common law;40 (3) “there is no federal general 
common law;”41 and (4) the holding in Swift created an 
“unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United 
States.”42  Erie involved a Pennsylvania citizen, Tompkins, who was 
injured after being struck by a door on a freight train belonging to the 
Erie Railroad Company, a New York corporation, which was passing by 
him as he walked alongside the right of way.43  Tompkins brought an 
action against Erie Railroad alleging negligence.44  Erie argued that 
Pennsylvania common law applied, which would have declared 
Tompkins to be a trespasser and would have reduced Erie’s liability to 
cases involving wanton and willful negligence as opposed to ordinary 
negligence.45  Tomkins argued that federal general common law should 
be applied, and Pennsylvania c 46
The holding in Erie established that unless the issue deals with the 
injunction, relied on Swift and stated that the federal courts were “free to exercise their own independent 
judgment” on questions of general law.  See id. at 527–30. 
 38. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 39. Id. at 78. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 
518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 43. Id. at 69. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id.  The Supreme Court cited several reasons for its decision to overturn Swift.  First, the 
court established that the Supreme Court misinterpreted the RDA in Swift by excluding state common 
law in its interpretation of “laws.”  See id. at 71–74.  Secondly, the Supreme Court stated that the 
benefits of a more uniform state common law and increased certainty expected to result from Swift never 
came to fruition.  See id. at 74.  Thirdly, the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of diversity of 
citizenship, to prevent non-citizens from discrimination in state courts, was being thwarted by the 
application of the doctrine of Swift, which was creating an avenue for non-citizens to discriminate 
against citizens through the use of forum shopping and abuse of the lack of uniformity in the law.  See 
id. at 74–75.  The court noted that citizens willing to relocate to another state could reap the benefits of 
diversity jurisdiction and the federal general common law.  Finally, the Supreme Court asserted that the 
holding in Swift was unconstitutional.  Id. at 77–78 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules 
of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’” and “no clause 
in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”). 
8
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Federal Constitution or Acts of Congress, state substantive law, 
including state common law, should be applied.47  Erie established that 
state substantive law was to be applied by the federal courts in diversity 
cases, but federal procedure was to be applied.48  Federal courts often 
struggled with the divide between procedural law and substantive law.  
Procedure has been defined as “the judicial process for enforcing rights 
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering 
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”49 
4. Hanna v. Plumer 
Subsequent cases established the diverging paths of analysis under 
Erie.  Hanna v. Plumer and its progeny govern the judicial 
determination of what law is to be applied when the case is governed by 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The second path of Erie analysis 
involves cases where no federal rule or statute directly controls the issue, 
which requires the courts to apply the RDA with regard to the “twin 
aims of Erie.” 
a. Hanna and the REA 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hanna, the Court decided 
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,50 which established an “outcome 
determinative” test that ignored the distinction between substance and 
procedure and held that in diversity cases in federal court, the federal 
court should defer to the state rule if ignoring it could result in the 
determination of the case being decided differently in federal rather than 
state court.51  The elimination of the line between substance and 
procedure following York led to several decisions which held that state 
procedures should apply in diversity in the face of conflicting federal 
rules seemingly on point.52 
In Hanna v. Plumer, the Supreme Court held that in diversity actions 
 47. See id. 
 48. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965). 
 49. Id. at 464 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
 50. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 51. See id. at 108–09. 
 52. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (In a stockholder’s 
derivative action, the Supreme Court applied a New Jersey statute requiring plaintiff to give security 
instead of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 with no security requirements); Ragan v. Merchants 
Transfer & Warehouse Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (In determining proper tolling of the statute of 
limitations, the Supreme Court applied a Kansas statute that required service of summons to begin 
tolling and not Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, which requires filing of a complaint.). 
9
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where a federal rule directly conflicts with state procedural law, the 
Rules Enabling Act (REA), and not the RDA as construed by Erie, is to 
govern the decision and that federal courts should apply the federal rule 
as long as the rule is not in violation of the REA.53  Hanna involved a 
suit filed in federal court in Massachusetts based on diversity between 
Hanna, an Ohio resident, and the defendant, a Massachusetts resident.54  
The suit claimed damages stemming from injuries suffered by Hanna in 
an automobile accident where the defendant was allegedly negligent.55  
The dispute centered on whether the statute of limitations had expired 
based on inadequate service of process.56  Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(d)(1) at the time Hanna was decided, service was sufficient 
if left at the dwelling with a person,57 whereas under Massachusetts state 
law, proper service required delivery in hand.58  The Court concluded 
that Rule 4(d)(1) “neither exceeded the congressional mandate embodied 
in the Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed constitutional bounds” and 
the rule should have been used to determine the sufficiency of the 
service of process.59  The holding in Hanna established that when the 
conflicting laws involve federal and state procedure, the federal rule 
should govern unless the federal rule violates the REA.60  Subsequent 
cases clarified that if the federal rule is “‘sufficiently broad’ to cause a 
‘direct collision’ with the state law or, implicitly, to ‘control the issue’ 
before the court,” the federal rule must be applied.61 
 53. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470–71. 
 54. Id. at 461. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 461–62. 
 57. Id.  “The summons and complaint shall be served together.  The plaintiff shall furnish the 
person making service with such copies as are necessary.  Service shall be made as follows: (1) Upon an 
individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of 
the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of 
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein . . . .”  Id. 
 58. Id. at 462 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 197, § 9 (1958) (“served by delivery in hand”)). 
 59. Id. at 464. 
 60. See id. at 471. 
 61. Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987) (citing Walker v. Armco 
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1980); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471–72).  The Supreme Court held that 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, which grants discretionary authority to courts to award 
damages after concluding appeals were frivolous, governed a diversity action over a state law mandatory 
penalty on unsuccessful appeals.  See id. at 8.  The Supreme Court concluded that the federal rule and 
the state provision sufficiently conflicted through the federal rule’s discretionary impact and the state 
provision’s mandatory effect.  Therefore, the federal rule would preclude the application of the state 
provision in diversity actions.  Id. at 7. 
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b. RDA and the Twin Aims of Erie 
In cases not involving a conflict where a federal rule is directly on 
point, conflict of law decisions are resolved under the RDA and the twin 
aims of Erie.  Few cases have explored the application of the RDA and 
the twin aims of Erie, and the scope of the application has been limited. 
In dicta, the Supreme Court in Hanna expressed that in conflicts not 
arising from a federal rule, when determining whether state or federal 
law should apply, York’s “outcome determinative” test is used with 
reference to the twin aims of Erie, which are “discouragement of forum-
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”62  
Forum shopping with regard to choice of law issues involves choosing 
to issue a complaint and litigate in state or federal court on the basis of 
the advantages a party would receive through application of the law of 
the forum.  Inequitable administration of the laws requires “allowing an 
unfair discrimination between noncitizens and citizens of the forum 
state.”63  Inequitable administration of the law has also been explained 
as being violated when one party to litigation has “access to a favorable 
rule unilaterally.”64  Inequitable administration has also been described 
as “subjecting a person involved in litigation with a citizen of a different 
state to a body of law different from that which applies when his next 
door neighbor is involved in similar litigation with a co-citizen.”65 
The Supreme Court asserted that “every procedural variation is 
‘outcome determinative.’”66  The Court stated that “nonsubstantial, or 
trivial, variations [in the law were] not likely to raise the sort of equal 
protection problems which troubled the Court in Erie; they are also 
unlikely to influence the choice of a forum.”67  The Court concluded that 
although the application of the federal rule would be “outcome 
determinative,” the difference between the rules would not lead to forum 
shopping or inequitable administration of the laws.68  Under Hanna 
 62. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
 63. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 40 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1938)). 
 64. Robert A. de By, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or Procedural for Erie 
Purposes, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1080 (1989). 
 65. Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reigning in the Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. 
REV. 305, 348 (1994) (quoting John H. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 712 
(1974)). 
 66. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 468–69.  The Court stated that in choosing the forum, the difference between 
federal and state law would not bar recovery, but would only change the manner of service of process.  
Id.  In concluding that there would not be inequitable administration of the laws, the Court stated that the 
difference between in hand and third party service would not “alter[] the mode of enforcement of state-
11
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dicta, if the conflict of laws does not involve a federal rule, the 
“outcome determinative” test of York is to be applied with reference to 
the twin aims of Erie to determine if state or federal law applies.69 
In Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh,70 Justice Scalia’s dissenting 
opinion engaged in a full Erie analysis.71  Stewart involved a dispute 
over a dealership agreement that contained a forum selection clause 
selecting state and federal courts in New York City or Manhattan as the 
forum for any disputes.72  Using diversity jurisdiction, the suit was filed 
in federal court in Alabama, a state with law unfavorable to forum 
selection clauses.73  The respondent moved to have the case transferred 
to the Southern District of New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),74 a 
federal venue statute, or to have the case dismissed for improper 
venue.75  The majority concluded that § 1404(a) governed the dispute,76 
but Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, conceded that § 1404(a) 
and the related state law were not “perfectly coextensive.”77  In his 
dissent, Justice Scalia concluded that § 1404(a) was not “sufficiently 
broad to cause a direct collision with state law or implicitly to control 
the issue before the Court.”78  Justice Scalia noted that § 1404(a) “is 
simply a venue provision that nowhere mentions contracts or 
agreements, much less that the validity of certain contracts or 
agreements will be matters of federal law.”79  After reaching this 
conclusion, Justice Scalia concluded that because there was no relevant 
federal rule or statute guiding the legality of the clause, an analysis of 
the twin aims of Erie was necessary to determine whether state or 
federal judge-made law would control the issue.80 
Justice Scalia concluded that applying federal law would encourage 
forum shopping because plaintiffs would sue in state court to avoid 
enforcement of forum selection clauses, where nonresidents would seek 
created rights in a fashion sufficiently ‘substantial’ to raise the sort of equal protection problems to 
which the Erie opinion alluded”  Id. 
 69. See id. at 467–68. 
 70. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
 71. See id. at 34–41. 
 72. Id. at 24 n.1. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).  “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have 
been brought.”  Id. 
 75. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24. 
 76. Id. at 28. 
 77. Id. at 30. 
 78. Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. at 37. 
 80. See id. at 38–39. 
12
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss1/11
SZUCH FINAL FORMAT 2 2/11/2011  4:24:45 PM 
2010] RECONSIDERING CONTRACTUAL WAIVERS 447 
 
out favorable law in federal court.81  Justice Scalia next addressed the 
issue of inequitable administration of the laws, and concluded that the 
outcome was chiefly determined by the importance of the question at 
issue, and “[i]t is difficult to imagine an issue of more importance, other 
than one that goes to the very merits of the lawsuit, than the validity of a 
contractual forum-selection provision.”82  Lastly, Justice Scalia noted 
that courts cannot and should not “ignore that issues of contract validity 
are traditionally matters governed by state law.”83 
When there is a choice of law issue, federal courts sitting in diversity 
are to apply Erie and its progeny.  Under the first path of Erie, governed 
by Hanna, federal courts are to apply the REA and the federal rule when 
the rule directly governs the issue.  Under the second path, when there is 
no federal rule or statute directly governing the issue, federal courts are 
to apply the RDA and conduct a twin aims of Erie analysis to determine 
whether application of federal law would lead to forum shopping or 
inequitable administration of the laws.  If either of these would result, 
federal courts are to apply state law in resolving the dispute. 
III. CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES TO JURY RIGHT WAIVERS 
Several federal courts sitting in diversity have addressed the issue of 
the validity of contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial.  A majority 
of courts have applied the federal “knowing, intentional, voluntary” 
standard to determine the validity of the waivers.  Recently, the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals engaged in a limited Erie analysis to conclude 
that state law governed the validity of a contractual waiver of the right to 
a jury trial.  This decision created a divide with the Second and Sixth 
Circuits.  This Part will explain the conflicting cases and the reasoning 
behind each court’s decision. 
 
 81. See id. at 40. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 41.  The twin aims or Erie were also analyzed in Chambers v. NASCO, where the 
defendant argued that if “federal courts [could] use their inherent power to assess attorney’s fees as a 
sanction in some cases, they are not free to do so when they sit in diversity, unless the applicable state 
law recognizes the ‘bad-faith’ exception to the general rule against fee shifting.”  Chambers v. NASCO, 
501 U.S. 32, 51 (1991).  The Supreme Court held that sanctions by the court did not implicate either of 
the twin aims of Erie because they would not lead to forum shopping because issuing sanctions under 
the bad-faith exception doesn’t depend on the victorious party to the lawsuit, but rather on the actions of 
the parties during the litigation, which would fail to lead to forum shopping.  Id. at 53.  The Supreme 
Court next concluded that the decision would not lead to inequitable administration of the laws because 
the parties to the dispute had the ability to decide whether they would receive sanctions based on their 
behavior and both citizens and non-citizens were able to be sanctioned.  See id. 
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A. I.F.C. Credit Corporation v. United Business & Industrial Federal 
Credit Union 
In I.F.C. Credit Corporation v. United Business & Industrial Federal 
Credit Union, the the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied Illinois 
state law in concluding that a waiver of a right to a trial by jury found in 
a lease provision was valid and enforceable.84  I.F.C. involved a 
telecommunications equipment and services provider, Norvergence, 
which entered into contractual agreements with customers that contained 
forum-selection and mandatory bench trial provisions.85  I.F.C. Credit 
Corporation was a commercial factor that purchased the right to 
payments under the contractual agreements between Norvergence and its 
customers.86  I.F.C. filed the action to enforce the mandated bench trial 
clause contained in Norvergence’s contracts with customers in order to 
recover payments due under those contracts.87 
The Seventh Circuit first concluded that the enforcement of the 
contractual waiver was governed by Illinois state law.88  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court relied on Abbott Labs. v. Tokeda Pharm. Co.,89 
which dealt with the validity of a forum selection clause and held that 
the clause’s validity would be determined under the law of the 
jurisdiction that controlled the remainder of the contractual agreement.90  
I.F.C. argued that under Simler v. Connor,91 the validity of the bench 
trial clause was to be determined under federal law.92  In Simler v. 
Connor, the Supreme Court held that a right to a jury trial was to be 
determined under federal law, in all actions.93  The Seventh Circuit 
found that although federal law controls the meaning of the Seventh 
Amendment, “[i]t does not follow that national law also controls the 
 84. See I.F.C. Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 991–92 
(7th Cir. 2008). 
 85. See id. at 991. 
 86. See id.  Norvergence’s business was successful for some time, but the corporation’s success 
was halted after its products were found to lack the benefits that had been advertised.  See id.  
Subsequently, Norvergence discontinued providing services to customers, who in turn stopped payment 
under their contracts.  See id. 
 87. See id.  The district court held that the mandatory bench trial provision was invalid and the 
issue was submitted to a jury.  See id.  The jury returned a verdict on the suit for payments for the 
defendant, United Business & Industrial Federal Credit Union.  See id. 
 88. See id. at 991–92. 
 89. Abbott Labs. v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 476 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 90. See id. at 423. 
 91. Simler v. Connor, 372 U.S. 221 (1963). 
 92. I.F.C., 512 F.3d at 991. 
 93. Simler, 372 U.S. at 222. 
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validity of a contractual agreement to a bench trial.”94  The court stated 
that under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,95 no general federal law of contracts 
exists.96 
Next, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the UCC97 governed the 
validity of the contractual waiver of a jury right because Illinois enacted 
the UCC.98  The court concluded that under the UCC, form contract 
terms are enforceable unless there is a “battle of the forms” or the terms 
of the agreement are unconscionable, neither of which applied to the 
contractual waiver.99  The court concluded that there were no relevant 
UCC provisions requiring any separate-signing or separate-negotiation 
for contractual agreements mandating bench trials.100  With regard to 
form agreements, the state of Illinois “honors straightforward terms with 
understandable meanings,”101 and the court found no ambiguities in the 
bench trial clause.102 
Lastly, the Seventh Circuit addressed the Second and Sixth Circuit 
arguments that the contractual waiver of the right to a jury trial requires 
“knowing and intelligent” waiver by comparing this heightened standard 
to the relatively low standards of waiver under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 38 and contractual agreements to arbitrate.103  The Seventh 
Circuit stated that the heightened scrutiny placed on contractual waivers 
of the jury right would be inconsistent with the fact that a person can 
waive the right merely by “accidental forfeiture.”104  Along with 
accidental waiver under Rule 38, the court held that agreements to 
arbitrate, which forfeit jury trial rights along with rights to any judicial 
forum, are not subject to the scrutiny given to contractual waivers of the 
right to a trial by jury.105  I.F.C. established that contractual waivers of 
the right to a jury trial should be resolved by applying state law. 
 94. I.F.C., 512 F.3d at 991. 
 95. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 96. I.F.C., 512 F.3d at 991–92. 
 97. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 20. 
 98. I.F.C., 512 F.3d at 992. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (citing Nicor, Inc. v. Assoc. Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd., 860 N.E.2d 280, 285–86 (Ill. 
2006)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Rule 38 states “[a] party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed.  A 
proper demand may be withdrawn only if the parties consent.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d). 
 104. I.F.C., 512 F.3d at 993. 
 105. Id. at 994. 
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B. National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix 
In National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix,106 the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that a loan repayment contract provision 
forfeiting the right to a jury trial was invalid and unenforceable under 
federal law because there was no evidence of knowing and intentional 
relinquishment of the right to a jury trial.107  H. Walter Hendrix owned a 
construction company and purchased two pieces of equipment, which 
created large outstanding debts to be paid down on a monthly basis.108  
Hendrix became unable to pay down the required amounts under the 
debts and sought a solution to his financial dilemma.109  Hendrix entered 
into an agreement with National Equipment Rental (NER) whereby 
NER paid Hendrix’s outstanding debts and in turn, Hendrix would make 
monthly payments to NER.110  Without explanation, the Second Circuit 
applied federal law to the issue of the contractual waiver of the right to a 
trial by jury.111 
The Second Circuit briefly addressed the issue of the standard to be 
applied in determining the validity of contractual waivers of jury trial 
rights.  The court cited Johnson v. Zerbst112 for the proposition that “[i]t 
is elementary that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury is fundamental 
and that its protection can only be relinquished knowingly and 
intentionally.”113  The court failed to note that Johnson was a criminal 
case involving the validity of a voluntary waiver of the Sixth 
Amendment right to assistance of counsel.114  The court concluded that 
the location of the waiver “literally buried in the eleventh paragraph of a 
fine print, sixteen clause agreement” did not satisfy the alleged knowing 
and intentional waiver requirement for the Seventh Amendment right to 
a jury trial.115 
Along with Johnson, the Second Circuit quoted Justice Black’s 
dissenting opinion in Equipment Rental, Ltd., v. Szukhent, which argued 
that a printed form provision “buried in a multitude of words is too weak 
an imitation of a genuine agreement to be treated as a waiver of so 
 106. Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd., v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 107. See id. at 258. 
 108. Id. at 256. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 257. 
 111. See id. at 258. 
 112. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 113. Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258. 
 114. See Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 115. Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258. 
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important a constitutional safeguard.”116  In Szukhent, the Supreme 
Court upheld a form provision regarding service of process on an agent 
specified in the contractual agreement.117  In distinguishing this 
decision, the Second Circuit argued that the right to a jury trial is more 
fundamental than the right to personal service and requires knowing and 
intentional waiver.118  Lastly, the Second Circuit argued that the 
contractual waiver failed to satisfy the knowing and intentional 
requirement as a result of the gross inequality in bargaining power of the 
parties to the contract.119  National Equipment established that 
contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial are governed by the federal 
“knowing and intentional standard.”120 
C. K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co. 
In K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co.,121 the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that a contractual waiver of a jury right provision in a 
financing agreement was invalid and unenforceable under federal law.122  
K.M.C. was a wholesale and retail grocery corporation which entered 
into a financing agreement with Irving, whereby Irving obtained an 
interest in K.M.C.’s accounts receivable and inventory and in return 
provided K.M.C. with a line of credit that was originally $3 million and 
was later extended to $3.5 million.123  In 1982, Irving refused to advance 
K.M.C. money under the agreement, which was within the $3.5 million 
limit, and K.M.C. filed an action for a breach of a duty of good faith 
performance against Irving.124  At trial, although the financing 
agreement contained a provision waiving a right to a trial by jury, the 
Magistrate ordered a jury trial as a result of a statement by K.M.C.’s 
president that before the agreement was signed, an Irving representative 
informed him that the jury waiver would not be enforced.125  The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of K.M.C. and awarded over $7.5 million in 
damages for the breach of contract violation.126 
 116. Id. (quoting Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd., v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 332–33 (1964) (Black, J., 
dissenting)). 
 117. Id. at 258 n.1. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)). 
 120. Id. at 258. 
 121. K.M.C. Co., Inc., v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 122. See id. at 755–58. 
 123. Id. at 754. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 755. 
 126. Id. 
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On appeal, the Sixth Circuit briefly concluded that the right to a jury 
trial was to be determined by federal, not state law.127  The Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that “the constitutional right to jury trial may only be waived if 
done knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally, and that whether this 
standard was met in a given case is a constitutional question separate 
and distinct from the operation of rules of substantive contract law.”128 
Next, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of what standard should 
apply to determine the validity of contractual waiver of a jury right.  The 
court acknowledged that the Supreme Court, in Fuentes v. Shevin,129 “in 
applying the knowing and voluntary standard to a waiver of due process 
rights in a conditional sales agreement, cautioned that it was ‘not 
holding that [the] standards [governing waiver of constitutional rights in 
a criminal proceeding] must necessarily apply.’”130  In Fuentes, the 
Supreme Court established that a waiver of a constitutional right “must, 
at the very least, be clear.”131  Following the Sixth Circuit’s 
acknowledgment that the Supreme Court’s language could be interpreted 
as setting forth ambiguous standards to be applied to contractual waivers 
of a jury right, the Sixth Circuit maintained its position relying on the 
bandwagon effect and arguing that an overwhelming majority of cases 
dealing with the validity of contractual waivers of jury rights applied the 
knowing and voluntary standard.132 
The Sixth Circuit also acknowledged the irregularity between the 
knowing and voluntary standard applied to contractual waivers of jury 
trials and the enforcement of inadvertent waivers of the same right under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(d).133  While Rule 39(b) grants the 
court discretion in granting the right to jury trials after a party fails to 
demand the right, “it is settled today that the mere statement of 
‘oversight’ or ‘inadvertence’ does not suffice to invoke the discretion of 
the court.”134  The Sixth Circuit responded to this by noting that the 
distinction between a pre-litigation contractual waiver and a procedural 
error made after the initiation of litigation created a valid rationale for 
 127. Id. (citing Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963)). 
 128. Id. at 755–56. 
 129. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
 130. Irving, 757 F.2d at 756 (quoting Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 94). 
 131. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 95. 
 132. See Irving, 757 F.2d at 756 (citing Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 
(2d Cir. 1977); N. Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 572 F. Supp. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982); Sanchez v. 
Sirmons, 467 N.Y.S.2d 757, 760 (1983)). 
 133. Id. at 756 n.4. 
 134. Id. (quoting 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 39.09, at 39–30 (2d 
ed. 1984)). 
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the opposing standards.135  To support this proposition, the court cited 
Francis v. Henderson,136 where the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
in criminal cases the interests of “the orderly administration of criminal 
justice” would allow for constitutional rights to be subject to procedural 
default.137 
In reaching its conclusion that the contract waiver was invalid, the 
Sixth Circuit reasoned that the contractual waiver in the financing 
agreement failed both the knowing and voluntary and “clear” standards 
due to the understanding of K.M.C.’s president that the jury waiver 
provision would not be enforced.138 
IV. DISCUSSION 
This Comment argues that the language in Simler v. Connor is not 
applicable to cases involving contractual waivers of the right to a jury 
trial.  Next, this Comment conducts an Erie analysis on the issue of 
contractual waivers of the jury right and concludes that there is no 
bright-line rule for which law should apply.  Finally, this Comment 
argues that if federal law is to be applied, the federal standard should not 
be the heightened knowing, voluntary, and independent standard that has 
been applied in criminal cases involving waiver, but rather the lower 
standard consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act and Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 38. 
A. Simler Does Not Apply 
Cases use the language in Simler v. Conner139 that “the right to a jury 
trial in the federal courts is to be determined as a matter of federal law in 
diversity as well as other actions”140 for the proposition that federal law 
automatically applies to contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial.  
Taken out of context, the assertion by the Supreme Court in Simler 
could be viewed as being determinative of the choice of law dispute 
present between the circuit courts.  Simler involved a dispute over 
whether a claim was legal or equitable,141 which determines the right to 
a trial by jury in federal courts.  However, the dispute in Simler did not 
 135. Id. 
 136. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976). 
 137. Irving, 757 F.2d at 756 (quoting Francis, 425 U.S. at 539). 
 138. Id. at 757. 
 139. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963). 
 140. Id. at 222. 
 141. Id. 
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involve a contractual waiver of the right to a jury trial, nor did the court 
address any issues of federal common law regarding contractual waivers 
of the right to a jury trial.  Thus, the language of the Supreme Court in 
Simler has no bearing on the validity of a contractual waiver of the right 
to a jury trial.  Under this interpretation of Simler, a full analysis of the 
choice of law conflict is required. 
This interpretation of Simler may generate criticism for underplaying 
the Court’s seemingly strong language.  Under a stronger reading of the 
Simler language, which would assume that the contractual waiver of a 
jury right is implicitly encompassed by the language of the Court, the 
result would be an application of federal law to the issue of contractual 
waivers.  This interpretation still does not completely resolve the issue 
because there is no federal law on the issue of contractual waivers of the 
right to a jury trial.142  While the choice of law issue would be 
eliminated, no statutes or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directly 
addresses the contractual waiver of the Seventh Amendment right.143  
There still must be a determination of what the content of the federal law 
should be under the guidance of United States v. Kimbell Foods.144 
B. Erie Analysis 
Courts must conduct a full Erie analysis in order to determine 
whether state or federal law is to be applied when determining the 
validity of contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial.  The first step 
is to determine whether a federal rule or statute directly governs the 
issue of the validity of contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial.  If 
no rule or statute exists, the Erie analysis then moves to whether the 
application of federal law would implicate the twin aims of Erie.  If 
application of the federal waiver standard would lead to either forum 
shopping or an inequitable administration of the law, state law must be 
applied. 
1. REA 
The first hurdle in conducting an Erie analysis is to determine 
whether a federal rule or federal procedural statute covers the issue in 
 142. Sternlight, supra note 14, at 678. 
 143. The FAA covers arbitration agreements, which implicitly include waivers of the right to a 
jury trial, but to the best of the author’s knowledge, the FAA standard has not been applied by federal 
courts sitting in diversity. 
 144. U.S. v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979). 
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controversy.145  The statute or rule must be “sufficiently broad to cause a 
direct collision with state law or implicitly control the issue before the 
Court.”146  Rule 38 is the only relevant rule governing waiver of the jury 
right, but the rule is not sufficiently broad to govern the validity of 
contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial.  Rule 38(d) establishes a 
procedure whereby a party in a suit waives the right to a jury if the right 
is not demanded.147  As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissenting 
opinion in Stewart, the allegedly conflicting federal provision “nowhere 
mention[ed] contracts or agreements, much less that the validity of 
certain contracts or agreements will be matters of federal law,” and 
therefore did not sufficiently conflict with state law.148  Similarly, Rule 
38(d) contains no language mentioning contracts, agreements, or the 
validity of such agreements, and therefore is not sufficiently broad to 
automatically govern the choice of law issue surrounding contractual 
waivers of the right to a jury trial.  In concluding that the federal venue 
provision did not govern the dispute, Justice Scalia noted that “it is 
difficult to believe that state contract law was meant to be pre-empted by 
this provision that we have said ‘should be regarded as a federal judicial 
housekeeping measure.’”149  Justice Scalia’s language is applicable to 
Rule 38(d), which could be viewed as a “housekeeping measure” to 
ensure that litigants follow the proper steps in requesting a jury.  Federal 
Rule 38(d) is not sufficiently broad to cover the issue of contractual 
waivers of the right to a jury trial because the statute contains no 
language relevant to contracts, agreements, and applicable laws, and 
because the Rule is merely a “housekeeping measure” used to ensure 
proper requests for the jury right that in no way encompasses the issue 
of contractual jury right waivers. 
Similarly, the Federal Arbitration Act does not directly govern the 
validity of contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial.  The Act 
specifically addresses issues surrounding agreements to arbitrate.  While 
arbitration agreements implicitly include waivers of the right to a jury 
trial, the Act does not explicitly govern contractual waivers and cannot 
be read to encompass all forms of jury right waiver. 
2. RDA 
Because no federal rule or statute directly governs the issue of 
 145. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 34 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 146. See id. (citing Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987)). 
 147. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d). 
 148. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636–37 (1964)). 
21
Szuch: RECONSIDERING CONTRACTUAL WAIVERS OF THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
SZUCH FINAL FORMAT 2 2/11/2011  4:24:45 PM 
456 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial, it must be determined 
whether the twin aims of Erie are implicated by the application of 
federal law.  Due to the ambiguous federal standard and the varying 
state laws, no bright-line rule exists as to whether state or federal law 
should be applied.  Individual courts will need to engage in a twin aims 
analysis on a case by case basis with regard to the laws of the state 
implicated by the dispute.  For the purposes of this Erie analysis, it will 
be assumed that the federal standard is the frequently applied knowing, 
independent, and voluntary standard.  If application of the federal 
standard would lead to either forum shopping or inequitable 
administration of the law, the state standard must be applied. 
a. Forum Shopping 
Applying federal law will likely lead to forum shopping in cases 
where the applicable state standard differs from the heightened federal 
standard.  Forum shopping will not be implicated in cases where the 
applicable state law parallels the heightened federal law standard.  In 
states such as Illinois, which apply UCC contract standards,150 forum 
shopping would be implicated by application of federal law.  Consistent 
with Justice Scalia’s conclusion of the implication of forum shopping 
with regard to forum selection clauses in Stewart,151 here, plaintiffs 
seeking to enforce waivers would sue in state court to reap the 
advantageous, less rigorous state standard governing validity, where 
nonresidents seeking to avoid enforcement of the waiver would seek out 
the more favorable and more stringent federal standard in federal court. 
In states such as Georgia and California, which expressly prohibit 
contractual waivers of the jury right,152 forum shopping would also be 
implicated.  Litigants seeking to avoid waivers will sue in state court 
where the waiver has no chance of surviving the express prohibition, 
where litigants seeking to enforce the waivers will seek the somewhat 
more advantageous federal standards in federal court that would at least 
give a possibility for the waiver to be found valid. 
In contrast, application of federal law would not lead to forum 
shopping in states with standards similar to the heightened federal 
standard.  In these instances, there would be no added benefit to a 
litigant filing suit in either forum.  There can be no bright-line rule for a 
 150. I.F.C. Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
 151. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 39–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 152. Thomley, supra note 22, at 127 (citing Bank S., N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 799 (Ga. 
1994); Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 493 (Cal. 2005)). 
22
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss1/11
SZUCH FINAL FORMAT 2 2/11/2011  4:24:45 PM 
2010] RECONSIDERING CONTRACTUAL WAIVERS 457 
 
determination of whether forum shopping will be encouraged by the 
application of federal law because of the varying state standards as well 
as the ambiguous federal standard. 
b. Inequitable Administration of the Law 
If application of federal law is not found to lead to forum shopping, 
the federal court must next determine whether application of federal law 
would lead to inequitable administration of the law.  Inequitable 
administration of the laws requires “allowing an unfair discrimination 
between noncitizens and citizens of the forum state.”153  The analysis 
regarding this prong of the twin aims of Erie is somewhat unclear.  
Justice Scalia noted that a determination of whether the discrimination 
would be unfair turned upon the importance of the issue in question.154 
In states where the state standard is lower than the federal standard 
applied to waivers, a nonresident plaintiff seeking to enforce the waiver 
will sue a resident defendant in the state court.  This gives the 
nonresident plaintiff a “unilateral choice” whether or not to enforce the 
contractual waiver.155  “A resident defendant cannot remove the action 
to federal court.”156  This gives the nonresident plaintiff a unilateral 
choice of which standard will be applied to govern the waiver.  “On the 
other hand, a nonresident defendant can remove [a case] to federal 
court.”157  This establishes that a nonresident plaintiff and a nonresident 
defendant are given a benefit over a resident defendant158 in determining 
what standard will be applied to the enforceability of the contractual 
waiver of the right to a jury trial.  “This is the kind of discrimination by 
‘non-citizens against citizens’ that Erie tried to avoid.”159 
Some have argued that this does not lead to inequitable administration 
because a resident plaintiff is able to file suit in federal or state court 
against a nonresident defendant.160  If the plaintiff seeks to avoid 
enforcement of the waiver and files suit in state court, the nonresident 
 153. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 40 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64, 74–75 (1938)). 
 154. Id. (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965)). 
 155. Robert A. de By, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or Procedural for Erie 
Purposes, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1080 (1989). 
 156. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982)). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938)). 
 160. Id. (citing P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 788 (3d ed. 1988)). 
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defendant can remove the case to federal court.161  Removal to federal 
court is not an option for a resident defendant, therefore, “compared to 
another resident plaintiff who sues a co-citizen, the resident plaintiff 
suing the nonresident defendant is at a disadvantage.”162 
In states where the federal and state standards parallel each other, the 
problems that lead to inequitable administration of the laws will not 
occur.  Decisions by resident and nonresident plaintiffs and defendants 
alike will not be altered by the option of federal or state court.  There 
will be no advantage to filing in state or federal court, and there will also 
be no benefit to nonresidents in being able to remove cases filed in state 
court to federal court because the applicable standards will be the same.  
Therefore, there is no bright-line determination of whether or not 
application of federal law will lead to inequitable administration of the 
laws.  This will only occur in cases where the federal and state standards 
applied to contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial are dissimilar. 
C. Federal Standard 
If an Erie analysis concludes that federal law is to be applied in a 
diversity case involving a contractual waiver of a jury right, there is still 
no clear federal standard to be applied.163  This Comment recommends 
that the applicable federal standard that should be applied should be a 
lower contract standard that is consistent with the lower standards set 
forth in the Federal Arbitration Act and more consistent with the Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 38(d) “inadvertence” standard, rather than the 
heightened “intelligent, knowing and voluntary” standard that has been 
commonly applied in lower courts.  Adoption of a federal standard that 
is consistent with standards applied to other forms of jury right waiver 
will lead to a more uniform application of laws regarding jury right 
waiver and more homogeneous results with regard to the outcome of 
litigation involving jury right waivers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Courts cannot continue to skirt the choice of law issue by failing to 
engage in a full and complete Erie analysis and placing unwarranted 
reliance on the Supreme Court’s language in Simler.  There can be no 
bright-line rule under Erie as to whether federal or state law should be 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1080–81 (citing John H. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 
712 (1974)). 
 163. See supra notes 14–19. 
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applied because in certain circumstances, federal law significantly 
differs from state law, and in other instances, federal law and state law 
parallel each other.  Federal courts sitting in diversity must engage in a 
full analysis under Erie to determine whether application of federal law 
will lead to forum shopping or inequitable administration of the law. 
While most courts appear to adopt the criminal law waiver standard 
of “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent” waiver, the federal standard is 
somewhat unclear.  A federal standard should be adopted that is more 
consistent with the FAA and Rule 38(d), which would apply contract 
standards of waiver in determining the validity of a contractual waiver 
of the right to a jury trial. 
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